Moral behaviour requires learning how our actions help or harm others. Theoretical 3 accounts of learning propose a key division between 'model-free' algorithms that 4 efficiently cache outcome values in actions and 'model-based' algorithms that 5 prospectively map actions to outcomes, a distinction that may be critical for moral 6
Introduction 18 19
A central component of human morality is a prohibition against harming others 1, 2 . 20
People readily avoid actions that might harm another person [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , and this basic harm 21 aversion is so strong that many people even find it distressing to perform pretend 22 harmful actions, such as shooting someone with a fake gun 8 . Harm aversion is 23 disrupted in clinical disorders such as psychopathy that have a strong developmental 24 component 9 , and although harm aversion is robust in healthy adults, anyone who has 25 watched young children fighting over a coveted toy knows that such an aversion is not 26 present from birth. Indeed, a large literature documents the emergence of moral 27 conduct over the course of development 10, 11 . Cross-cultural differences in morality 28 suggest moral behavior is fine-tuned to local environmental demands 12 , and lab 29 experiments demonstrate how individuals can quickly adapt moral behavior to 30 changing norms 13, 14 . All this evidence highlights a critical role for learning in the 31 development of harm aversion and moral behaviour more broadly 6 . 32 33 learning processes that fast-track harm-avoidant action selection to a habitual, 82 automatic process may be socially adaptive. Supporting this view, recent work 83 suggests that morality constrains mental representations of what actions are 84 considered possible; harmful actions are removed from choice sets as a default 50 , and 85 choices that harm others are slower than helpful choices, suggesting an automatic 86 tendency to avoid harm 5,51,52 . Furthermore, recent studies of model-free learning to 87 gain rewards for oneself and others have highlighted a distinct encoding of prediction 88 errors concerning others' outcomes in the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex 89 (sgACC) 53,54 , a region that has been implicated in social and moral decision-making 90 more broadly [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] . Model-free processes that distinguish learning about how one's 91 actions affect others could provide a neural mechanism for prioritizing model-free 92 learning in moral contexts. 93
94
To test these competing hypotheses, we used computational modelling and fMRI to 95 probe the relative balance between model-based versus model-free processes, and 96 their neural bases, when people learn to avoid moderately painful electric shocks for 97 themselves and a stranger. After undergoing a pain thresholding procedure (see 98
Methods), participants (N=36) completed a hybrid version of two paradigms previously 99
proposed to reliably dissociate model-free versus model-based learning ( Figure  100 1) 20,22,31 . We optimized the task in a way that allowed us to address the specific 101 hypotheses examined in the present study (see Supplementary Note on Experimental 102
Design for details). 103
Participants completed a two-step decision-making task to index model-free and 126 model-based learning strategies (Figure 1) . Prior to scanning, participants were 127 trained on the transition structure of the task using stimuli different from the main 128 experiment which allowed them to learn the probabilistic transition structure. The two-129 step task distinguishes model-free and model-based learning by measuring people's 130 choices to stay or switch based on the outcome of the previous trial and the transition 131 structure. Theoretically, a purely model-free learner would ignore the transition 132 structure and repeat first-stage choices if they prevented pain on the previous trial but 133 switch choices if the previous choice caused pain. Thus, model-free learning is 134 reflected in a main effect of outcome (pain versus no pain) on subsequent first-stage 135 choice behaviour. In contrast, a model-based learner would take the transition 136 structure into account. While behaviour on common transitions would be similar for a 137 model-free agent, after rare transitions, a model-based agent would repeat a first-138 stage choice if the outcome was pain, but switch if the outcome was no pain. Thus, 139 model-based learning is reflected in an interaction between outcome (pain versus no 140 pain) and transition (common versus rare). It is now well established that people 141 display a combination of model-free and model-based learning strategies when 142 learning about rewarding outcomes 20, 31, 59 and initial evidence indicates that the same 143 is true for learning about aversive outcomes for oneself 60, 61 . We therefore first 144 examined whether participants displayed a combination of model-free and model-145 based processes during aversive learning for oneself and others, as observed in these 146 previous studies. 147 148 We performed a logistic regression analysis predicting first-stage stay versus switch 149 choices as a function of the outcome (pain or no pain), transition on the previous trial 150 (common or rare) and recipient (Self vs. Other). We included all main effects and 151 interactions in the model. We found a significant main effect of outcome (t(35)=4.618, 152 p<.001, confidence interval (CI) for beta estimate: 0.17, 0.42, Cohen's d = 0.77) 153
indicating a contribution of model-free learning, but also a significant transition by 154 outcome interaction (t(35)=-3.173, p=.003, CI for beta estimate: -0.23, -0.05, d = -155 0.53), indicating the presence of model-based learning (Figure 2a,b) . This 156 demonstrates that similar to reward learning, aversive learning is underpinned by a 157 mixture of model-based and model-free processes. 158 159 Intriguingly, we also found a significant interaction between outcome (the model-free 160 contribution to learning) and recipient, showing that people were more model-free for 161 others relative to self (t(35)=-2. 31 To further examine which outcomes most influenced the outcome x recipient 179 interaction, we performed separate post-hoc tests on the percentage of stay/switch 180 choices for self and other following (a) only pain outcomes and (b) only no pain 181 outcomes. This showed that the recipient difference was driven by increased switching 182 after pain outcomes for other versus self (p=.028), with no difference between 183 recipients in the proportion of stay/switch choices after no pain outcomes (p=.552). 184 This is important because the specificity of the effect rules out that people were simply 185 more indifferent or inattentive to the outcomes of others compared to self. 
197
('stay') is plotted as a function of the transition and outcome on the previous trial. This shows that the 198 outcome x recipient interaction in (a) is mostly driven by fewer stay trials after pain, regardless of 199 transition (two rightmost blue vs orange bars). Thus, the more pronounced model free behaviour for 200 others is mostly driven by a lower probability of staying after pain outcomes rather than a higher 201 probability of staying after no pain outcomes). (c) w estimates from the best fitting model showed that 202 the w parameter was significantly lower for other (0.45) than self (0.55) consistent with the regression 203 analyses that showed people were more model free when avoiding harm to others compared to self 204 (p<.02). Asterisks indicate significant difference at p<.05.
206
Computational modelling of aversive learning for self and other 207 208 Next, we fitted several trial-by-trial computational models to our data to examine 209 further which model best captured the described behaviours during aversive learning 210 for self and other. Deriving such trial-by-trial estimates that capture individual choice 211 preferences was a prerequisite for modelling the fMRI data and allowed us to support 212 our logistic regression analyses. We started with the full seven-parameter model 213
proposed by Daw and colleagues 20 and compared this model to similar models with 214 fewer parameters (four of five) following modifications similar to those suggested in 215 previous studies (e.g. 62,63 ); for details, see Methods and Supplementary Table 2 ). 216
We also included variants of the same models that involved separate learning rates 217 for pain and no pain outcomes, given evidence suggesting differential learning as a 218 function of outcome valence (e.g. 64, 65 ). All of these models were initially fitted 219 separately on self and other blocks. 220
221
We found that a five-parameter model best explained behaviour compared to all 222 alternative models tested. This model included separate learning rates for no pain and 223 pain outcomes (aPain, aNoPain), a single temperature parameter capturing choice 224 randomness (b), a perseverance parameter capturing a tendency to stick with the 225 previously made choice (r) and a model-free/model-based weighting parameter (w). 226
Importantly, this five-parameter model best explained behaviour in both the self and 227 other blocks ( Supplementary Table 2 ). 228
229
We next compared the different estimated parameters for the self and other blocks. 230
This analysis showed a significant difference between the conditions in both the 231 perseverance parameter r (t(35)=2.41, p=.02,) and the model-free/based weighting 232 parameter w (t(35)=3.10, p=.0039; Supplementary Table 3 ). To compare these 233 parameters more robustly, we then used maximum a-posteriori estimation performed 234 on the pooled data of self and other blocks to compare three models, one with 235 separate perseverance r and w parameters for self and other (and thus a total of seven 236 parameters), one with separate w parameters for self and other (and therefore a total 237 of six parameters), and the original 5 parameter model (which assumes the same r 238 and w across self and other blocks). We used these models to examine whether 239 differences in the r and w parameters between self and other when fitted separately 240 reflected true differences in the weighting of these parameters in a model comparison. 241
This analysis showed that the model with separate w's for self and other, but not 242 separate r's, best explained the data. Importantly, these w parameters were also 243 significantly different from one another (selfw = 0.55, otherw = 0.45, t(35)=2.41, 244 p=.02, d=0.40, Figure 2c and Supplementary Table 4 and 5). Thus, consistent with 245 the regression based behavioural analyses that did not rely on a computational model 246 (Figure 2a) , participants were more model-free than model-based when learning to 247 avoid harming others, compared to self (Figure 2c) . 248
Subcortical areas distinguish model-free prediction errors for self and other 250 251
Previous neuroimaging studies of model-based and model-free reward learning have 252 reported model-free prediction error signals in ventral striatum 20 . We therefore first 253 sought to replicate this effect in our aversive learning paradigm. To facilitate 254 comparison with previous studies of reward learning, no-pain outcomes were coded 255 as 1 and pain outcomes coded as -1. Therefore, a positive prediction error represents 256 unexpected pain relief/avoidance, and a negative prediction error represents 257 unexpected pain. 258
259
We built a general linear model (GLM1) that contained onsets for the first stage choice, 260 second stage choice and outcome separately for self and other trials. These three time 261 periods were each associated with parametric modulators from our winning model. 262
These included the value difference between the two options at the first stage choice; 263 the state prediction error based on the transition at the second stage choice; and the 264 model-free prediction error at the time of the outcome. We focused our analysis on 265 model-free prediction errors at the time of the outcome for two reasons. Firstly, our 266 behavioural effects showed that self/other differences in learning emerged for model-267 free but not model-based learning. Secondly, model-free and model-based prediction 268 errors are highly correlated and careful examination of their separate influences has 269 shown that they are both encoded in ventral striatum 20 . 270
271
We began our analyses by examining whether previously reported neural correlates 272 of value difference and state prediction errors were also observed in our novel 273 paradigm. Several areas tracked inverse value difference and thus showed larger 274 responses for choices that had a smaller value difference between the two first-stage 275 options, including the most dorsal parts of anterior cingulate cortex near pre-SMA, 276 bilateral inferior parietal cortex and middle frontal gyrus (Supplementary table 1) , 277 regions previously associated with the tracking of inverse subjective value 278 difference 66-68 . These signals did not differ between self and other (see 279 Supplementary Table 1 ). Also consistent with previous findings 21 , we found evidence 280 of a main effect for state prediction errors at the second stage in dorsal ACC (x=-6, y=10, z=52, Z=4.85, K=906, p<.001 FWE-corrected) that again showed overlap 282 between self and other (see Supplementary table 1) . 283 284 Next, we tested whether model-free prediction errors were present in ventral striatum, 285
as reported in a previous study examining model-based and model-free reward 286 learning for self 20 and several studies of reward based reinforcement learning 69 . We 287 found a large bilateral cluster signalling prediction errors of harm avoidance (positive 288 for no pain, negative for pain) in ventral striatum (right x = 10, y = 12, z = -4, k=236, 289 Z= 5.84, left x = -16, y = 6 , z = -10, k=458, z= 5.77, p<.05 FWE-whole brain corrected 290 after initial thresholding at p<.001). Again, this signal did not significantly differ for self 291 and other conditions (Right t(34) = -.14, p=.89, Left t(34) = -1.47, p = .152)). 296 FWE-whole brain corrected after initial thresholding at p<.001) tracked model-free prediction errors for 297 both self and other bilaterally, with no significant differences between conditions.
299
Given that our behavioral results indicated model-free learning was prioritized when 300 avoiding harm to others (relative to self), we next sought to identify areas that 301 distinguished model-free prediction errors for others (relative to self). This analysis 302 revealed a cluster in the thalamus extending into the caudate (x =16, y = -18, z =0, 303 k=84, p=.033, Z=3.50 FWE-small volume corrected (SVC) after initial thresholding at 304 p<.001, see Methods Figure 4a ,b). The cluster positively tracked prediction errors of 305 pain avoidance when learning for other (t(33)= 2.30, p=.028) and negatively tracked 306 prediction errors of pain avoidance when learning for self (t(33)= -2.89, p=.007). 307
Although this cluster extended into the caudate, the caudate ROI itself was not 308 significant (x =18, y = 6, z =0, Z=3.49, k=2, p=.064, FWE-SVC after initial thresholding 309 at p<.001). 
318
Signatures of model-free influence are encoded in sgACC and TPJ 319 320 One signature of model-free learning is a tendency to repeat previously rewarded 321 actions and avoid previously punished actions, regardless of experienced 322 transitions 20 . Such a model-free influence is thought to emerge at the time of choice 323 by activating the reinforcement histories of potential actions and driving selection of 324 the most valuable action in terms of its recent history 70 . In the context of our task, 325 through model-free influence, an action that was unpunished on the previous trial 326 should be prioritized for selection ('stay'), while an action that was punished on the 327 previous trial should be avoided ('switch'). Importantly, because model-free learning 328 is insensitive to task structure, this process should occur regardless of whether the 329 transition from the first to the second stage experienced on the previous trial was 330 common or rare. 331 332 Therefore, to probe the neural signatures consistent with a model-free influence at the 333 time of choice, and any potential differences between self and other conditions, we 334 examined neural responses during 'switch' and 'stay' choices at the first stage as a 335 function of the outcome on the previous trial (no pain or pain). We created an additional 336 GLM (GLM2) that modelled the onset of self trials after pain, self trials after no pain, 337 other trials after pain, and other trials after no pain, with stay (-1) and switch (1) coded 338 as parametric modulators of each of these onsets. Thus, our analysis examined 339 differential neural encoding of stay vs. switch decisions on the current trial, as a 340 function of the outcome on the previous trial (pain or no pain) and its recipient (self or 341 other). 342
343
Our analysis revealed a signal in sgACC consistent with a model-free influence on 344 'other' trials (x=-2, y=36, z=6, K=498; Z = 3.88, p=.028, FWE whole-brain corrected). 345
This region was more active during stay relative to switch choices on the current trial, 346 following a 'no pain' outcome on the previous trial, selectively in the 'other' condition 347 (see p=.03, FWE-SVC after initial thresholding at p<.001) tracks switch more than stay after no pain for other.
369
Cluster overlaid on an anatomical scan.
371
Increased functional connectivity between sgACC and dorsolateral prefrontal 372 cortex when resisting model-free influence 373
Behavioral analyses indicated that participants on average showed a mixture of 375 model-based and model-free strategies, but prioritized model-free learning when 376 avoiding harm to others. Thus, we next sought to identify regions that might modulate 377 the model-free effects observed specifically in the 'other' condition in sgACC ( Figure  378 6a). We therefore conducted psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analyses (GLM3) 379 to assess functional connectivity between sgACC and the whole brain as a 380 consequence of staying versus switching after no pain for other (see methods for 381 additional details of analyses). This analysis identified a significant negative 382 association between activity in sgACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (x=-46, y=38, 383 z=26, k=382, Z=4.12, p=.039, FWE-whole brain corrected after initial thresholding at 384 p<.001). 385
386
To understand the nature of this effect we plotted the average slope of sgACC and 387 dlPFC connectivity during stay and switch conditions (Figure 6b,c) . This showed that 388 there was a stronger positive coupling between sgACC and dlPFC during switch 389 choices compared to stay choices after receiving no pain for another person (Figure  390 6b-c). We did not observe significant coupling between sgACC and dlPFC during 391 switch or stay choices following no pain for self (Supplemental Analyses). 
407
Individual differences in moral judgment relate to model-free moral learning 408 409 Finally, we investigated whether individual differences in moral judgment were related 410 to individual differences in model-free moral learning and its neural basis. We 411 examined two aspects of moral judgment. First, motivated by theories suggesting that 412 'anti-utilitarian' judgments in moral dilemmas might be driven by model-free 413 processes 3,27 , we measured individual differences in utilitarian reasoning using the 414 Oxford Utilitarianism Scale 71 . Because our study concerned harmful outcomes, we 415 predicted that we would observe correlations with the 'instrumental harm' component 416 of the scale, which measures a permissive attitude towards harming one person in 417 order to help many others, but not the 'impartial beneficence' component of the scale, 418 which measures an impartial attitude towards helping others. First, we tested whether 419
utilitarianism was correlated with model-free behavior for others (relative to self). We 420 found a significant relationship between instrumental harm and model-free moral 421 behaviour, such that those who were the most anti-utilitarian were the most model-422 free (r(36) = 0.37, p = 0.026). However, there was no correlation with the impartial 423 beneficence subscale (r(36) = -.059, p = 0.731). Next, given past work linking 424 utilitarian reasoning with dLPFC function 72,73 , we predicted that utilitarianism would 425 positively predict dLPFC-sgACC connectivity when resisting model-free influence. 426
This prediction was supported, with dLPFC-sgACC connectivity positively correlated 427 with instrumental harm (r(33) = 0.43, p = 0.012), but not impartial beneficence (r(33) = 428 -.11, p = 0.537). 429 430 Second, we probed the sensitivity of moral wrongness judgments to how much 431 suffering an action inflicts on a victim ('outcome sensitivity'), versus how aversive it 432 feels to perform the action ('action sensitivity' 74 ). Past work has connected the former 433 with model-based learning and the latter with model-free learning 3,27 . However, we 434 note that model-free learning is directly sensitive to recent outcomes 18 , which might 435 lead to an association between model-free behavior and outcome sensitivity. 436
Participants evaluated the moral wrongness of 23 harmful actions that varied 437 independently in how much suffering they would cause, versus how aversive they 438 would feel to perform. Action sensitivity and outcome sensitivity were inversely 439 correlated (r(36) = -.40, p = .016). Partial correlations controlling for action sensitivity 440 revealed that outcome sensitivity was positively correlated with several aspects of 441 model-free moral learning (Figure 7) , including the tendency to switch following harm 442 to others (r(36) = -.37, p=.027), the strength of model-free prediction error signals for 443 other vs. self in thalamus/caudate (r(34) = .385, p = .025), and the strength of model-444 free influence in sgACC (r(33) = -.374, p = .032). The reverse partial correlations 445 testing for the effect of action sensitivity whilst controlling for outcome sensitivity were 446 not significant (all p's>.08, all |r's| <-.30). Together these findings suggest that a natural 447 tendency to engage in model-free moral learning when avoiding harm to others is 448 related to how moral judgments of others' harmful actions track with harm severity. Learning to avoid actions that harm other people is a fundamental prerequisite for 466 moral behaviour. Here we show that people prioritize model-free learning when 467 actions have the potential to harm others, and that learning to avoid harming others 468 (vs. self) has a distinct neural signature. The thalamus/caudate differentially encoded 469 prediction errors of pain avoidance for self versus other, whilst sgACC and right TPJ 470 tracked positively and negatively with model-free influence on pain avoidance at the 471 time of choice. Overriding model-free influence when choices affected others invoked 472 stronger connectivity between sgACC and dlPFC. Finally, multiple aspects of moral 473 judgment were associated with model-free moral learning and its neural correlates. 474
In the context of our study, model-free moral learning manifested as a reduced 476 likelihood of repeating actions that harmed others on the previous trial, regardless of 477 whether such actions typically led to states with a high likelihood of harmful outcomes. 478
Our behavioural finding that people were more model-free when learning to avoid 479 harming others relative to themselves suggests that potentially harmful actions might 480 be prioritized for automatic avoidance as a default. Given the importance of avoiding 481 harm to others for social life, such a learning mechanism would be socially adaptive. An alternative explanation for our behavioral findings is that model-based learning is 494 effortful 26 , and people choose to put in less effort to benefit others 75 . However, this 495 explanation seems unlikely given that model-free moral learning in our study was 496 specifically driven by a lower probability of repeating choices that harmed others. In 497 other words, participants were more likely to actively switch their choices following 498 harm to others, rather than passively sticking with the status quo. Our results were 499 also not due to differences in the subjective perception of the harmfulness or 500 aversiveness of the outcomes for others compared to self, as participants overall rated 501 shocks received for others in the task as being just as aversive as shocks received for 502
themselves. Furthermore, we did not observe differences in choice consistency 503 (captured by the temperature parameter in our model) during learning for self vs. 504 others. Since choice consistency is related to task engagement, if our behavioral 505 effects reflected reduced effort for others, we would expect to see lower choice 506 consistency when learning for others than self. Together these alternative 507 considerations suggest that people might naturally prioritize model-free 508 strategies/behaviours when avoiding harm to others, and these effects may not simply 509 be explained by less effort or engagement when actions affect others relative to 510 oneself. 511
512
Turning to the neural findings, we observed a signal in the thalamus, extending to the 513 caudate, that differentially encoded model-free prediction errors when learning to 514 avoid harming others versus self. These subcortical regions were previously observed 515 to encode value during moral decisions to avoid profiting from others' pain 4 and play 516 a critical role in associative learning and moral-decision-making more broadly 40, 42, 44, 45 . 517
The thalamus is often linked to the processing of the affective dimension of pain in 518 addition to its sensory properties 76 . For example, microstimulation of the thalamus can 519 invoke affective memories of previously experienced pain 45 . The thalamus/caudate 520 signal differed from the adjacent ventral striatum response that positively tracked 521 model-free prediction errors regardless of the recipient of the outcome, consistent with 522 a previous study using a similar task with rewarding outcomes for self only 20 . These 523 findings suggest that multiple sub-cortical areas support model-free moral learning, 524 perhaps with ventral striatum providing a generic model-free prediction error signal 525 that is insensitive to outcome valence and outcome recipient, and thalamus/caudate 526 providing additional information about social context. 527
528 Another signature of model-free influence was observed in sgACC at the time of 529 choice, contingent on the outcome of the previous trial and specific to the 'other' 530 condition. Specifically, signal in sgACC was higher when participants repeated actions 531 that previously avoided harming others, but not during similar choices for oneself. This 532 pattern is consistent with model-free behavior, and individual differences in model-free 533 behavior tracked with individual differences in sgACC response at the time of choice. 534
Notably, previous work has implicated sgACC in model-free learning to gain rewards 535 for others but not self 53 and in receiving unexpected positive feedback from others 77 , 536 suggesting this region might compute learning signals that are specific to social 537 settings. More broadly, activity in sgACC has been positively associated with prosocial 538 and moral behaviours 15, 54, 55, 57 . 539
540
Collectively these findings suggest that sgACC might bias decision-making away from 541 choices that could harm others. However, this default strategy is not always 542 appropriate, for instance in settings where a typically harmful action might lead to a 543 better outcome. We observed signals at the time of choice in two areas that negatively 544 tracked with model-free influence. The first, in right TPJ, showed a response pattern 545 precisely opposite to that observed in sgACC. Signal in rTPJ was higher when 546 participants abandoned a choice that previously avoided pain for others, but not during 547 similar choices for oneself. In addition, overriding model-free influence at the time of 548 choice was associated with increased functional connectivity between sgACC and 549 dLPFC. These two regions showed stronger coupling on trials where participants 550 abandoned a choice that previously avoided pain for others, compared with trials 551
where participants repeated actions that previously spared others from pain. Although 552 we cannot confidently attribute these patterns to model-based control, past work has 553 implicated dLPFC and TPJ in model-based learning and decision-making 31, 70 . One 554 intriguing possibility is that sgACC promotes social harm avoidance as a default, while 555 TPJ and dLPFC provide contextual information that enables this default to be 556 overridden when appropriate. Research implicating these regions in the adjustment of 557 moral decisions to blame and punishment provides initial support for this 558 possibility 5,32,33,39,47 . 559 560 Finally, we observed correspondences between model-free learning, its neural 561 substrates, and moral judgments. Theoretical work has proposed links between 562 model-based/model-free learning and moral judgment 3,27,28,78 , but empirical support 563 for such links has been scarce. We probed two aspects of moral judgment. First, we 564 examined individual differences in the dimension of 'utilitarian' moral reasoning that 565 justifies harming one person to help many others. Consistent with our predictions, as 566 well as work highlighting a link between dLPFC activity and 'utilitarian' judgments 73 , 567
we found a positive relationship between instrumental harm and dLPFC-sgACC 568 connectivity when resisting model-free influence. We also observed that those who 569
were the most anti-utilitarian were the most model-free. 570 571 Second, using a task that asks participants to judge how morally wrong it would be to 572 perform a series of violent actions that varied independently in terms of how much 573 suffering they would inflict ('outcome sensitivity'), versus how aversive they felt to 574 perform ('action sensitivity') 74 . We found that individual variability in both the 575 behavioural and neural signatures of model-free learning was specifically correlated 576 with outcome sensitivity, but not action sensitivity. Those people whose moral 577 wrongness judgments were more sensitive to the severity of harmful outcomes were 578 less likely to repeat decisions that harmed others, and showed stronger model-free 579 prediction error signals in the thalamus and caudate, and stronger responses in 580 sgACC when repeating decisions that previously avoided harming others. Model-free 581 learning has previously been suggested to explain why actions that typically harm 582 others feel aversive to perform, even when they are not actually harmful 3,27 . Thus, one 583 might expect that a greater tendency to engage in model-free moral learning should 584 predict action sensitivity in moral judgments, rather than outcome sensitivity. However, 585 model-free learning is directly sensitive to recent outcomes 18 , and in the context of our 586 task, manifested as a tendency for choices to be immediately sensitive to harmful 587 outcomes for others. Thus, individual differences in sensitivity to others' harm could 588 be commonly associated with model-free moral learning and outcome sensitivity in 589 moral judgments. Overall, these findings provide preliminary evidence linking model-590 free learning to individual differences in moral judgments, effects that could be 591 investigated more extensively in larger samples. 592
593
More broadly, our findings highlight differences in the neurocognitive mechanisms 594 engaged in learning to avoid harming oneself versus others that underscore the unique 595 demands of social decision-making. One important feature of decisions that affect 596 others (as opposed to oneself) is that it is far more difficult to build a model that 597
incorporates others' preferences and beliefs than a model that captures only one's 598 own preferences. Furthermore, it is impossible to evaluate the accuracy of such 599 models, given that the subjective experiences of others are fundamentally unknowable 79, 80 . Utilitarian approaches to moral decision-making that involve 601 maximizing well-being for all sentient beings 81 may thus be computationally intractable 602 for the model-based system. Rule-based approaches, like those enshrined in 603 deontological theories of morality 82 circumvent the need for complex model building 604 and may be socially adaptive even for simple social decisions like the ones studied 605 here. Whether the prioritization of model-free learning extends to other kinds of social 606 decisions, such as acting to obtain rewards for others, avoiding monetary losses or 607 indeed even social decision-making in nonhuman species, is an important topic for 608 future study. 609
610
Overall, we observed that when learning to avoid harm to others (versus self), 611 participants showed a stronger relative balance toward model-free over model-based 612 learning. Multiple model-free learning signatures were apparent in behaviour as well 613
as cortical and subcortical areas that distinctly process harm avoidance for others 614 compared to self. These findings could have important implications for theories of 615 learning and moral-decision-making as well as disorders associated with impaired 616 avoidance learning and social cognition. 617
618
Methods 619 620
Experimental procedures 621
Participants 622
Forty-one right-handed healthy adults were recruited through university participant 623 databases. Exclusion criteria included previous or current neurological or psychiatric 624 disorder, non-normal or non-corrected to normal vision, previous participation in 625 studies involving social interactions and/or electric shocks and contraindications that 626 prohibited MRI scanning. One participant was excluded as they reported that they did 627 not believe their decisions would affect another person in the post-scanning debrief. 628
Three participants were excluded because the logistic regression analysis of their 629 choice behaviour did not converge. In two of these participants, this was because they 630 had less than 5% switch trials; in the third participant, there was a very high correlation 631 (>0.8) between the outcome and transition regressors on switch trials. One participant 632 was excluded from the fMRI analysis due to distortions in the scan caused by metal 633 artefacts (braces) and another for excessive head motion. This left a final sample of 634 36 participants for behavioural analyses (16 female, age 18-36) and 34 participants 635 Participants completed a pain thresholding procedure which was based on previous 646 studies of self and other pain processing 4,5 . The pain thresholding procedure allowed 647 us to control for heterogeneity of skin resistance between participants to ensure the 648 delivered shocks would be rated at a matched subjective level of pain intensity and 649 also to provide participants with full experience of the shocks before the learning task 650 to ensure their choices were truly guided by knowledge of the pain and no pain 651 outcomes. Participants were then assigned to roles of either 'decider' or 'receiver' 652 using a role assignment procedure that has been used in several previous studies 653 (see 5, 75 ). Briefly, participants were instructed to wear coloured rubber gloves to hide 654 their identity. They then stood either side of a door and waved to one another so that 655 they knew another person was there but could not discern any information about the 656 other participant's age or gender. Next a coin was flipped to decide who would draw a 657 ball out of a box first and then each participant drew a ball. The experimental 658 participant was then told that the colour of their ball meant they had been assigned to 659 the role of decider. Before completing the task in the scanner participants performed 660 a practice task of one block that did not specify whether outcomes were for self or 661 other and they were told no actual shocks would be received during the practice. This 662 practice task, which used stimuli not used in the experimental task, allowed participants to become familiar with the transition structure of the task, that they were 664 told would remain the same in the main experiment. The main experiment consisted 665 of 4 blocks of 68 trials (136 trials for self and 136 trials for other) and lasted ~45 666 minutes. deliver pain or no pain would change throughout the task so that they needed to keep 695 on learning. Adding the 'receiver' trials meant that fewer trials, overall, were included 696 in each condition compared to the original paradigm 20 . We therefore made two 697 modifications to the original paradigm in order to better sample variability in behaviour. 698
We bounded the probability that the four second-stage options would deliver pain 699 between 0 and 1 (instead of 0.25 and 0.75 in 20 ) and we increased the drift rate of the 700 probabilities to 0.2 (instead of 0.025 in 20 ). Moreover, we specifically chose to 701 implement the main aspects off the Daw et al. 20 , version of the paradigm rather than 702 using all the modifications described in 26 , as the Daw et al. 20 , paradigm allowed us to 703 assess peoples' relative balance between model-free or model-based behaviour 20,26 704 when there was no particular incentive to being more model-free or model-based on 705 the task because the degree of model-basedness did not affect the number of shocks 706 received. 707
Statistical analysis of behavioral data 708
Analyses of behavioural data were performed in SPSS 25 (Armonk, New York: IBM 709
Corp, for bivariate correlations), R (version 1.1.423, for linear mixed-effects modelling, 710 lme4, version 1.1-21) and Matlab 2015b (for logistic regression analyses on the 711 probability of stay). For Fig 2a, we calculated the % of stay choices after common or 712 rare transitions following pain or no pain outcomes (2x2). For regression analyses 713 using lme4 in R, we coded Stay as 1 and Switch as 0 and created regressors for 714 transition type, outcome, outcome x transition type, agent x outcome and agent x 715 outcome x transition type. We used Bound Optimization by Quadratic Approximation 716 (bobyqa) with 1e5 function evaluations. We examined bivariate associations between 717 the interactions with agent from the regression analyses and neural responses with 718 individual differences in utilitarianism using the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) 71 719 and action and outcome sensitivity from the Harmful Action Outcome Scale 74 . 720 721
Moral judgment measures 722
Participants completed the OUS instrumental harm (OUS-IH), OUS Impartial 723
Beneficence (OUS-IB) scales and the HAO scales via an online link in the preceding 724 weeks before the scanning session. The OUS-IH consists of 4 items reflecting a 725 relative willingness to cause harm to others in order to bring about the greater good 726 (e.g., "It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary 727 means to helping several other innocent people"). The OUS-IB subscale consists of 5 728 items reflecting endorsement of the impartial maximization of the greater good even 729 at a cost to oneself (e.g. if the only way to save another person's life during an 730 emergency is to sacrifice one's own leg, then one is morally required to make this 731 sacrifice). Participants rated these items on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 732 strongly agree). A mean score was then computed for all participants. 733
734
For the HAO participants were presented with a scenario about two people, Carl and 735
John. They are told John is terminally ill and sincerely wants to die and has asked 736 another person, Carl, to perform a mercy killing. Participants then rated how morally 737 wrong each of the 23 methods of killing were on a scale from 1 -the least morally 738 wrong, to 10 -the most morally wrong. In a previous study 74 participants were asked 739 to rate the action value and outcome value of these different methods of killing. To 740 assess action value, the researchers asked participants to rate how upsetting it would 741 be to "act out" performing each behavior as though it were part of a movie script. To 742 assess outcome value, they asked them to rate how much suffering each act would 743 impose. We used the mean action and outcome scores derived from this initial paper 744 to predict the 'wrongness' scores in our current sample. This analysis created two 745 different beta weights for each participant corresponding to the action and outcome 746 sensitivity, respectively. 747 748
Computational modelling of behavioural data 749 750
For modelling of choice behaviour using trial-by-trial updates, we proceeded in two 751 steps. First, we evaluated a number of models separately based on their performance 752 on the self and other blocks. This was to probe whether the same model would win for 753 self and other blocks, allowing us to rule out participants might employ entirely different 754 strategies in the two block types. The following models were fitted: 755
(1) 7-parameter: full model specified by Daw et al. using parameters: learning rates 757 for stage 1 and 2 (aS1, aS2), temperature parameters for stage 1 and 2 (bS1,bS2), a 758 perseverance parameter (r), an eligibility trace (l) and a model-free/based weighting 759 parameter (w); for full details of model see Supplementary information and 20 760
(2) 6-parameter model, as (1) but with l=1 (l was shown to have a high mean value 761 and small variance in previous work e.g. 62 ) 762
(3) 5-parameter model, as (1) but with only one a and b for stage 1 and 2 763 (4) 4-parameter model, as (3) but with l=1 764 (5) 5-parameter model, as (4) but with two learning rates for pain and no pain 765 outcomes (aPain, aNoPain) 766 767 Models were fitted using a hierarchical Bayesian model fitting approach described in 768 detail in 83, 84 . It finds the maximum a posteriori estimate of each parameter for each 769 subject using a prior distribution for each parameter which helps to regularise and 770 constrain parameters. The algorithm uses Expectation-Maximization (EM) 85 and 771 parameters were transformed to a logistic or exponential distribution to enforce 772 constraints and ensure normality such that 0<{a,w}<1, {b,l}>0. The five-parameter model with separate learning rates for pain and no-pain outcomes 781 best explained behaviour in both self and other conditions (Supplementary Table 2) . 782
We report the difference between the best-fitting parameters, but this method has a 783 caveat. Because of the nature of hierarchical fitting, which uses separate priors for self 784 and other parameters, this method is somewhat biased towards finding differences. 785
Meanwhile, fitting self and other parameters using the same priors, is overly 786 conservative and biased against finding differences. 787
To resolve whether the parameter w differed between self and other blocks, in line 789 with results from the basic logistic regression analyses, and without introducing any 790 such biases, in a second step, we therefore fitted three models to the merged data of 791 both self and other blocks: 792
(1) 5-parameter model (as (5) above) with all parameters shared between 793 self/other 794
(2) 6-parameter model with aPain, aNoPain, b and r shared but w split into wSelf 795 and wOther 796
(3) 7-parameter model with aPain, aNoPain, b shared and r and w split into rSelf, 797 rOther, wSelf and wOther 798
As described above, model comparison was performed based on BICint values 799 Table 4 ). The mean parameter estimates are shown in 800 Supplementary Fig 3 and Supplementary Table 5 . We also simulated data from our 801 participant schedules and showed that we had reliable parameter recovery 86 802 803
(Supplementary

FMRI acquisition and analysis 804
Multiband T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) volumes with blood oxygenation-805 level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were acquired using a Siemens Prisma 3T MRI 806 scanner. The EPI volumes were acquired in an ascending manner, at an oblique angle 807 (≈30˚) to the AC-PC line to decrease the impact of susceptibility artefacts in the 808 orbitofrontal cortex. We used the following parameters. Voxel size 2 x 2 x 2, TE=30 809 ms; repetition time=1570ms; flip angle=90°; field of view=216 mm. The structural scan 810 was acquired using a magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) 811 sequence with 192 slices; slice thickness=1 mm; TR=1900 ms; TE=3.97 ms; field of 812 view=192 mm x 192mm; voxel size=1×1×1 mm resolution. 813 814 Fmri data were analysed using SPM12 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Images were 815 realigned and unwarped using a fieldmap and co-registered to the participant's own 816 anatomical image. The anatomical image was processed using a unified segmentation 817 procedure combining segmentation, bias correction, and spatial normalization to the 818 MNI template using the New Segment procedure; the same normalization parameters 819 were then used to normalize the EPI images. Lastly, a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm 820 FWHM (SPM default) was applied to spatially smooth the images. 821 822 Before the study, example first-level design matrices were checked to ensure that 823 estimable GLMs could be performed with independence between the parametric 824 regressors: value difference at the first-stage choice, the state prediction error at stage 825 2, and a model-free prediction error at the time of the outcome. This allowed us to look 826 at value and prediction error responses independent from one another. We also tested 827 a GLM that coded switch vs. stay trials as a parametric modulator at the time of choice 828 dependent on the previous outcome. Again this GLM could be estimated with 829 independence (See Supplementary Figure 1) . We convolved these different event 830
types with SPM's canonical haemodynamic response function. All events were 831 modelled as stick functions with 0 duration. 832
833
For GLM1, each of these regressors was associated with parametric modulators 834 taken from the computational model. At the time of the first stage choice this was the 835 value difference from the hybrid model combining model-free and model based 836 learning. At the time of the second stage choice this was the state prediction error for 837 the transition from stage 1 to stage 2, and at the time of the outcome this was the 838 model free prediction error (since the behavioural differences were in the model-free 839 parameters). In all cases, values were modelled separately for the onsets of self and 840 other trials. As in 20 , we fixed the parameters to the average values for self and other 841 ( Supplementary Table 4 ) but allowed w to vary. 842 843 For GLM2 we modelled whether participants stayed or switched at the first-stage 844 choice relative to the outcome on the previous trial, i.e. no pain or pain. Due to the 845 smaller number of trials included in this analysis we coded stay and switch as a 846 parametric regressor with values of 1 assigned to switch and -1 assigned to stay. One 847 participant did not have a trial in at least one of these regressors and was therefore 848 excluded from the stay-switch analysis. For all GLMs in some participants, an extra 849 regressor modelled all missed trials, on which participants did not select one of the 850 first-stage choices. 851
